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Abstract Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. According to one
of the most prominent arguments in favour of this view, ordinary people experience
morality as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that
realism is true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that
ordinary people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological
research on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to contradict
this claim, four prominent earlier studies (by Goodwin and Darley, Wainryb et al.,
Nichols, and Nichols and Folds-Bennett) indeed seem to suggest a tendency towards
realism. My aim in this paper is to provide a detailed internal critique of these four
studies. I argue that, once interpreted properly, all of them turn out in line with recent
research. They suggest that most ordinary people experience morality as Bpluralist-^
rather than realist-seeming, i.e., that ordinary people have the intuition that realism is
true with regard to some moral issues, but variants of anti-realism are true with regard
to others. This result means that moral realism may be less well justified than
commonly assumed.
Moral realists believe that there are objective moral truths. One of the most
prominent arguments in favor of this view starts from a hypothesis about
ordinary people’s moral experience. Ordinary people experience morality as
Brealist-seeming^, proponents of the argument claim. In judging a thing right,
wrong, good, bad, etc. it seems to us as if we state objective moral truths (e.g.,
Dancy 1986, p. 172; Huemer 2005). Moreover, the assumption that there are
such truths underlies much of our moral practice (e.g., Brink 1989, pp. 24, 36),
and we also have the intuition or belief that there are such truths (e.g., Devitt
2002, p. 7; Sayre-McCord 2009).1
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That humans experience things in a certain way of course does not prove that things
actually are that way. We all know how appearances can be deceiving. Various realists
have argued, however, that the hypothesis that ordinary people experience morality as
realist-seeming (henceforth simply the Bexperiential hypothesis^) at least provides
strong prima facie reason to believe that realism is true (e.g., Brink 1989, pp. 24, 36;
Dancy 1986, p. 172; Huemer 2005, p. 115; Sayre-McCord 2009; Devitt 2002, p. 7).
Jonathan Dancy, for example, writes:
[W]e take moral value to be part of the fabric of the world; taking our experience at
face value, we judge it to be the experience of the moral properties of actions and
agents in the world. And […] we should take it in the absence of contrary
considerations that actions and agents do have the sorts of moral properties we
experience in them. This is an argument about the nature of moral experience, which
moves from that nature to the probable nature of the world. (Dancy 1986, p. 172)
Anti-realists have sometimes criticized arguments from moral experience by casting
doubt on their inductive validity (e.g., Joyce 2009b; Loeb 2007b).2 This article, in
contrast, rather focuses on the truth of the experiential hypothesis. Recently, some
proponents of this hypothesis have claimed that it is supported by psychological
research on how ordinary people think about the philosophical foundations of morality.
While most recent research has been thought to contradict this claim, four prominent
earlier studies indeed seem to suggest a tendency towards realism: studies by Goodwin
and Darley (2008); by Wainryb et al. (2004); by Nichols (2004); and by Nichols and
Folds-Bennett (2003). My aim in this article is to show that the experiential hypothesis
is not even supported by these early studies on folk moral realism.
One way of showing that the above studies fail to support the experiential hypothesis
would be to object against psychological research on folk moral realism or its relevance
for the assessment of this hypothesis in general. For example, it may be claimed that
ordinary people’s intuitions about the existence of objective moral truths are so vague that
they cannot be appropriately ascribed to variants of realism or anti-realism as discussed by
metaethicists (Sinclair 2012, p. 168); or that research on folk moral realism addresses
aspects of moral experience that the experiential hypothesis is not even supposed to apply
to (see Brink 1989, p. 25 for an understanding of the experiential hypothesis that may be
appealed to in this regard). Elsewhere (Pölzler 2014: 77–81) I argued that objections of
this kind are rather unconvincing. My following criticism of the above studies will
therefore be exclusively internal.
In Section 1 I will explain what proponents of the experiential hypothesis mean by
Bmoral realism^. In Section 2 I will introduce psychological research on folk moral
realism. In Sections 3 to 7, finally, I will provide a detailed analysis of the above
mentioned studies and their implications for the assessment of the experiential hypoth-
esis. I will argue that, once interpreted properly, all four early studies on folk metaethics
turn out in line with more recent research. They suggest that most ordinary people
experience morality as Bpluralist-^ rather than realist-seeming, i.e., that ordinary people
2 The label Bargument from moral experience^ was introduced by Don Loeb (2007). One also finds the
argument referred to as Bpresumptive argument^ (Sinclair 2012), Bstraightforward argument^ (Björnsson
2012) and Bburden of proof argument^ (Joyce 2009a).
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have the intuition that realism is true with regard to some moral issues, but variants of
anti-realism are true with regard to others.
1 Moral Realism
Just as metaethicists more generally, proponents of the experiential hypothesis have
defined realism and anti-realism in various different ways. In this article I assume a
definition proposed by Michael Huemer (2005), and in identical or very similar forms
endorsed by many other metaethicists as well (see, e.g., Brink 1989; Joyce 2007a;
Miller 2014, 2009).3 On this definition moral realism and anti-realism are about the
existence of objective moral truths. Are moral sentences truth-apt? If yes, are some of
these sentences actually true? And if yes, are these true sentences objectively true?
While anti-realists deny at least one of these questions, realists affirm all of them
(Huemer 2005, p. 4; see also Fig. 1 below).4
In order for the above definition of realism and anti-realism to be helpful one needs
to have some idea of how to understand Btruth^ and Bobjectivity .^ The sense of moral
truth that is at issue in the realism/anti-realism debate is a robust one, i.e., for a moral
sentence to be (objectively) true is supposed to mean that it correctly represents the
(objective) moral facts (Huemer 2005, pp. 38–44). By Bobjectivity^ realists and anti-
realists typically mean observer- (or mind- or subject-) independence. On the specific
conception of objectivity qua observer-independence assumed here (Huemer 2005, pp.
2–4), the relevant form of independence is a conceptual one (specifying what it means
for a thing to have a certain property)5; the relevant kind of observers are any observers
(human and non-human, actual and hypothetical); and the relevant kinds of mental
states of these observers are any mental states that these observers have towards the
thing at issue (beliefs, hopes, intentions, etc.). Thus, moral properties qualify as
objective if and only if we can explain what it means for a thing to have these properties
without referring to any mental state that any observer has towards that thing.
F-ness is subjective = Whether something is F constitutively depends at least in
part on the psychological attitude or response that observers have or would have
towards that thing. I define an ‘objective’ feature as one that is not subjective.
(Huemer 2005, p. 2)
The existence of objective moral truths in the sense explained above can be affirmed
and denied in various ways. For our purposes we need not bother with differences
3 Sometimes realism and anti-realism are defined in very different ways, for example, in exclusively semantic
terms (Dummett 1978, p. 146; Sayre-McCord 1988, p. 5) or as entailing an epistemic condition (e.g., Boyd
1988, p. 182). Note that my below arguments against the experiential hypothesis may not (fully) apply on such
alternative definitions.
4 By Bmoral^ sentences discussants of realism and anti-realism mean sentences which express moral judge-
ments, such as BHelping others is good^ or BStealing money is wrong^. Sentences about such sentences or
judgements (i.e., metaethical or descriptively ethical sentences) do not qualify as moral.
5 This conceptual understanding of observer-independence contrasts, for example, with an ontological one (a
property is objective if and only if it would be had by things if there existed no observers with mental states)
and a causal one (a property is objective if and only if the fact that the property is had by things is not caused
by the mental states of observers) (see Joyce 2007a; Pölzler 2014: 14–17).
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within realism (such as between the naturalism of Brink 1989 and the non-naturalism of
Huemer 2005). It is rather important to be able to distinguish between three main
variants of anti-realism: non-cognitivism, error theory and subjectivism.
According to non-cognitivism, the reason for there not being objectively true moral
sentences is that moral sentences are not even truth-apt.6 In uttering such sentences
people do not purport to represent facts, but rather only express non-cognitive mental
states such as feelings of approval or disapproval, intentions or sentiments. A. J. Ayer,
for example, famously claimed that to say BYou acted wrongly in stealing that money,^
is akin to saying BStealing money is wrong^ in Ba peculiar tone of horror,^ or to saying
BStealing Money: Boo!^ (1952, p. 107; see also, e.g., Gibbard 1990; Blackburn 2000).
Error theorists are cognitivists, i.e., they believe that moral sentences are truth-apt. In
contrast to realists, however, they hold that the facts that these sentences purport to refer
6 Many contemporary proponents of non-cognitivism have argued that moral sentences are truth-apt in a non-
robust (minimalist or deflationist) sense (e.g., Blackburn 2000, p. 79; Gibbard 2003, p. x). On such theories of
moral truth, in saying of moral sentences that they are true we do not attribute any property to these sentences
(such as the property of correctly representing the facts), but, for example, only reaffirm them.
Fig. 1 Variants of realism and anti-realism according to Huemer 2005, pp. 4–7
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to actually do not exist. This leads them to claim that all moral sentences are false —
just as, for example, atheists believe that all theistic sentences are false, or most
reasonable persons believe that all astrological sentences are false (see, e.g., Mackie
2011; Joyce 2001, 2007a, 2013; Lillehammer 2004; Pigden 2007).7
Subjectivists, finally, hold both that moral sentences are truth-apt and that some
of these sentences are true. Where they depart from realism is with regard to the
question of what makes true moral sentences true. While realists believe that these
sentences are made true by objective facts, subjectivists believe that the relevant
facts are subjective. Depending on the particular kind of observer-dependence that
it attributes to moral facts, subjectivism can be held in many different variants. The
four psychological studies on folk metaethics that will be considered below (partly
unintentionally) mainly address individual subjectivism, cultural relativism and
response dependence theory.
Individual subjectivists hold that a thing is right, wrong, good, bad, etc. if and only if
the person who judges it in that way believes that it is right, wrong, good, bad, etc.
Cultural relativists maintain that a thing is right, wrong, good, bad, etc. if and only if
the culture in which the judgement is made predominantly judges the thing right,
wrong, good, bad, etc. (e.g., Harman 1996). And according to response depen-
dence theorists, the moral properties of things are determined by how observers
respond to that thing under certain circumstances; for example, by whether
humans under normal conditions respond to the thing by having certain emo-
tions (Hume 1978; Prinz 2006, 2007), or by whether ideal observers would
approve of it (Firth 1952).8
2 Psychological Studies on Folk Moral Realism
Empirical psychology has long neglected metaethical intuitions. 9 In the last
15 years, however, interest in them literally exploded (e.g., Beebe 2014; Beebe
and Sackris forthcoming; Cova and Ravat 2008; Goodwin and Darley 2008,
2010, 2012; Nichols 2004; Nichols and Folds-Bennett 2003; Quintelier and
Fessler 2012; Quintelier et al. 2013; Sarkissian et al. 2011; Wainryb et al.
2004; Wright et al. 2013, 2014; Young and Durwin 2013). So far most studies
on folk metaethics have addressed the prevalence, causes or consequences of
what researchers referred to as moral Bobjectivism^ versus Bsubjectivism^ or
Brelativism^ (e.g., Goodwin and Darley 2008, p. 1341; Nichols and Folds-
Bennett 2003, p. B23). These studies may therefore seem irrelevant to assessing
7 My above formulation of error theory is controversial. First, error theory has often been restricted to
particular kinds of moral sentences, in particular, sentences which entail that a thing has some moral property
(e.g., Joyce 2007a; Pigden 2007, p. 451). And second, the relevant sentences have also sometimes been
claimed to be Buntrue^ rather than false (Joyce 2001, pp. 6–9, 2007a). For a plausible defense of the above
formulation see Loeb 2007a.
8 Response dependence theory is sometimes regarded as a variant of realism (e.g., Firth 1952, p. 322). This
classification is only warranted on ontological conceptions of observer-independence (as explained in fn. 5
above), though, and not on the conceptual conception assumed here (see Joyce 2007a).
9 Notable exceptions can be found in the child development literature, where researchers have in particular
explored the distinction between moral and conventional norms (e.g., Gabennesch 1990; Shantz 1982; Turiel
1978).
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the experiential hypothesis. However, as the labels Bobjectivism^, Bsubjectivism^
and Brelativism^ have been used in these studies, they are largely or even fully
equivalent to (variants of) realism and anti-realism as explained in Section 1
above.
By Bobjectivism^ researchers on folk metaethics have typically meant what is
here called Brealism^, i.e., the view that moral truths are objective. According
to Geoffrey Goodwin and John Darley, for example, objectivists claim that
moral beliefs or standards Bderive their truth (or warrant) independently of
human minds (i.e., objectively)^ (2008, p. 1341). Shaun Nichols and Trisha
Folds-Bennett similarly define objectivism as the view that B(i) true moral
judgments are nonrelativistically true and (ii) some moral judgments are true^
(2003, p. B24). 10 Moreover, when researchers have declared to explore folk
Bsubjectivism^ or Brelativism^ they have typically been concerned with what
was labelled Bsubjectivism^ above, i.e., with the view that moral truths depend
on the mental states of observers; or, as Goodwin and Darley put it, the view
that these truths are Bentirely mind-dependent or subjective^ (2008, p. 1341; see
also, e.g., Nichols 2004, p. 7).
Given these taxonomic similarities it is no wonder that discussants of the experien-
tial hypothesis have recently begun to develop interest in research on folk objectivism
versus subjectivism/relativism (see, e.g., Joyce 2007c; Sinclair 2012). Research of this
kind has in particular been claimed to support the experiential hypothesis. Richard
Joyce, for example, writes11:
Research reveals that Bcommon sense morality^ does include certain claims to
objectivity. […] moral prescriptions and values are experienced as Bobjective^ in
the sense that they don’t seem to depend on us, or on any authoritative figure.
(Joyce 2007c, pp. 129–130)
Is this verdict warranted? Most recent studies clearly contradict Joyce’s as-
sessment. As will be explained below (Section 7), they suggest a far more
complex picture, with metaethical intuitions varying interpersonally or
intrapersonally. Around the time of the publication of Joyce’s above quoted
book, however, the claim that the available psychological evidence supports a
tendency towards realism may well have been regarded as justified by many
scholars in the field. For various early studies on folk moral realism really did
report such a tendency, or have been claimed to show such a tendency by
discussants. Most prominently, this holds for studies by Goodwin and Darley
10 In contrast to the above mentioned psychologists, some metaethicists (e.g., Björnsson 2012, p. 369; Loeb
2008, p. 362) use the label Bobjectivism^ to refer to positions that are distinct from realism as understood here,
i.e., distinct from the view that there are objective moral truths.
11 Although Joyce endorses the experiential hypothesis and likely also some form of the argument from moral
experience (see Joyce 2010), he is not a realist. His above quotation is taken from a defense of moral
projectivism. As Joyce understands projectivism (Joyce 2009a, Joyce 2010), it involves two empirical claims:
the claim that humans experience morality as a realm of objective facts (i.e., the experiential hypothesis), and
the claim that this experience is immediately caused by affective attitudes (which he calls the Bcausal
hypothesis^). For a critique of the causal hypothesis, based both on studies about the relation between moral
judgements and emotions (Pölzler 2015) and on studies on folk moral realism, see Pölzler 2016.
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(2008), by Wainryb et al. (2004), by Nichols (2004); and by Nichols and Folds-
Bennett (2003).12 Goodwin and Darley, for example, sum up the results of their
study as follows:
Individuals seem to identify a strong objective component to their core
ethical beliefs [...]. Arguably, many of our participants viewed their
ethical beliefs as true in a mind-independent way. (Goodwin and
Darley 2008, p. 1359)
Nichols and Folds-Bennett draw an analogous conclusion about children’s metaeth-
ical intuitions:
The findings of both experiments support the claim that children do not regard
moral properties as response dependent. […] Together with previous findings
[…] these results suggest that children are indeed moral objectivists. (Nichols and
Folds-Bennett 2003, p. B30)
In what follows I will argue that contrary to such interpretations, not even the
above four early studies on folk moral realism provide any support for the
experiential hypothesis. First, I will show that once interpreted properly, these
studies are in line with more recent research. They too suggest that ordinary
people’s intuitions about the existence of objective moral truths vary strongly
(Sections 2 to 6).13 Then I will argue that this finding is mainly due to subjects’
intuitions varying intrapersonally, and that just as interpersonal variation, this
intrapersonal variation is incompatible with the experiential hypothesis as well
(Section 7). Note that throughout this discussion I will substitute researchers’
usage of the terms Bobjectivism^ and Brelativism^ by their equivalents as defined
above, i.e., by Brealism^ and Bsubjectivism^.
3 Research Isolating Non-Cognitivism
The first early study on folk metaethics that I will analyze is Geoffrey Goodwin
and John Darley’s groundbreaking 2008 study, in particular the first stage of
the first and the first stage of the second experiment of this study. In both of
these experiments subjects were presented a number of moral sentences, for
example, BAnonymously donating a significant proportion of one’s income to
charity is a morally good action,^ or BConsciously discriminating against
someone on the basis of race is morally wrong^ (2008, pp. 1361–1362). For
each of these sentences they were then asked a question that was supposed to
reveal whether they tended towards realism or subjectivism (see Goodwin and
Darley 2008, p. 1341).
12 Joyce most extensively appeals to Nichols and Folds-Bennett’s study (Joyce 2007c, p. 129).
13 Note that I will only consider those parts of the above-mentioned studies that are relevant to assessing the
experiential hypothesis.
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In the first experiment the question that was thought to bring out subjects’ metaeth-
ical intuitions was whether they considered the given moral sentence Btrue^, Bfalse^, or
Ban opinion or attitude^:
How would you regard the previous statement? Circle the number. (1) True
statement. (2) False statement. (3) An opinion or attitude. (Goodwin and Darley
2008, p. 1344)
As Goodwin and Darley interpreted subjects’ responses, Btrue^ and Bfalse^ re-
sponses indicated intuitions in favor of objectivism, and Bopinion or attitude^ responses
intuitions in favor of subjectivism (see 2008, p. 1345):
(R1) Btrue^ = Realism
(R2) Bfalse^ = Realism
(R3) Ban opinion or attitude^ = Subjectivism
In their second experiment Goodwin and Darley asked subjects whether they
thought there was a Bcorrect answer^ regarding the truth of the moral sentences they
were presented with:
According to you, can there be a correct answer as to whether this statement is
true? (Goodwin and Darley 2008, p. 1351)
Subjects could respond by marking either Byes^ or Bno^. On Goodwin and Darley’s
interpretation, Byes^ responses indicated realist intuitions, Bno^ responses indicated
subjectivist intuitions (see 2008, p. 1352):
(R1) Byes^ = Realism
(R2) Bno^ = Subjectivism
Goodwin and Darley’s methodology has been subject to extensive criticism. First, it
has been objected that as their question in Experiment 1 required subjects to make first-
order rather than only second-order moral judgements, this question may have been
misread as epistemic. Subjects may have chosen Btrue^ or Bfalse^ if they were
(strongly) convinced of the presented actions’ rightness/wrongness, and Bopinion or
attitude^ if they were rather uncertain about it (Beebe and Sackris forthcoming, p. 5;
Sinnott-Armstrong 2009, p. 244). Second, one may also worry that some Bopinion or
attitude^ and Bthere is no correct answer as to whether this statement is true^ responses
are attributable to subjects regarding the relevant sentences as non-moral (Wright et al.
2013, p. 338). More recent research suggests that neither of these alternative explana-
tions may be particularly significant, though (Goodwin and Darley 2010, p. 180;
Wright et al. 2013, pp. 341–342, 344). In what follows I will therefore focus on what
I take to be the above experiments’ main problem, namely their inadequate metaethical
interpretation of subjects’ responses.
Consider experiment 1. Goodwin and Darley assume that those who answer that a
given moral sentence is (R1) Btrue^ or (R2) Bfalse^ tend towards realism, and those
who answer that the sentence is (R3) an Bopinion or attitude^ tend towards
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subjectivism. But both of these categorizations are inadequate. To begin with, R1 and
R2 are not only consistent with realism, but also with all other variants of cognitivism,
i.e., with subjectivism and error theory. Subjectivists believe that moral sentences are
true or false depending on whether they correctly represent the subjective moral facts.
Error theorists believe that all moral sentences are false. Furthermore, R3 only appeals
to non-cognitivists, for only they believe that moral sentences cannot be assessed in
terms of truth or falsity at all. By contrasting subjects who opted for R1 and R2 with
those who opted for R3, Goodwin and Darley thus did not measure the prevalence of
realism versus subjectivism, but rather of cognitivism versus non-cognitivism:
(R1) Btrue^ = Cognitivism (Realism or Subjectivism)
(R2) Bfalse^ = Cognitivism (Realism, Subjectivism or Error Theory)
(R3) Ban opinion or attitude^ = Non-Cognitivism
Similar considerations apply to Goodwin and Darley’s second experiment as well.
The response that there is a correct answer as to whether a given moral sentence is true
(R1) is not only entailed by realism, but by all variants of cognitivism. Subjectivists
believe that the correct answer to the question of whether some moral sentence is true
can be Byes^ (if the sentence correctly represents the subjective facts) or Bno^ (if the
sentence does not correctly represent these facts). Error theorists believe that the correct
answer is always Bno^, i.e., that the sentence is not true. Moreover, the response that
there is no correct answer about whether a given moral sentence is true (R2) should
only appeal to non-cognitivists, for only according to them it does not make any sense
to ascribe truth or falsity to such sentences at all. Goodwin and Darley’s second
experiment thus again measures the proportion of cognitivists versus non-cognitivists:
(R1) Byes^ = Cognitivism (Realism, Subjectivism or Error Theory)
(R2) Bno^ = Non-Cognitivism
The results of Goodwin and Darley’s experiments have often been claimed to
suggest a tendency towards realism. Reinterpreted according to my above suggestions,
however, this clearly is not the case. As many as 62 % of the responses of Experiment 1
and 47 % of the responses of Experiment 2— in total more than half of the responses
— belonged to the non-cognitivist options R3 (Experiment 1) and R2 (Experiment 2)
(see 2008, pp. 1347, 1351; see Fig. 2). And the prevalence of intuitions in favor of anti-
realism in general was likely even considerably higher than that. After all, subjects’
cognitivist responses can reflect anti-realist (in particular, error theoretic or subjectivist)
commitments rather than realist ones as well.
4 Research Isolating Individual Subjectivism
The next early experiments on folk metaethics that I will turn to are the second stages of
Experiment 1 and 2 of Goodwin and Darley’s above 2008 study as well as an
experiment with children between the ages of five and nine conducted by Wainryb et
al. (2004). Subjects in both studies were confronted with one or more cases of moral
disagreement. For example, they were told that another subject of the study had denied
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a moral sentence that they themselves affirmed (Goodwin and Darley 2008, p. 1362),
or that two children disagreed about whether it is okay to hit and kick other children
(Wainryb et al., p. 688). The principal question of the experiments was how subjects
interpreted this disagreement (Goodwin and Darley 2008, p. 1363; Wainryb et al. 2004,
p. 691). Goodwin and Darley, for example, wrote:
You circled __ on the scale (1–6) which means that you strongly agreed/
disagreed with this statement. A person who we tested, strongly agrees/dis-
agrees with this statement, which means that he or she sharply disagrees with
you. What would you conclude about this disagreement? (Goodwin and Darley
2008, pp. 1362–1363)
Basically, subjects in both studies could choose between two kinds of answers:
either they stated that one of the disagreeing parties is right and the other one wrong; or
that it is possible or actually the case that both are right.14 Goodwin and Darley’s and
Wainryb et al.’s interpretation of these answers was almost identical. BOne of the parties
of the moral disagreement is right, the other wrong^ responses were taken to indicate
realism. BIt is possible that both are right/both are right^ responses were interpreted as
indicating subjectivism (see Goodwin and Darley 2008, pp. 1344–1345; Wainryb et al.
2004, p. 692):
(R1) One party in the disagreement is right, the other wrong = Realism
(R2) It is possible that both are right/both are right = Subjectivism
The main problem with Goodwin and Darley’s and Wainryb et al.’s methodology is
again their inadequate metaethical assumptions. First, as they describe the moral
disagreements at issue, R1 is not only entailed by realism, but also by various non-
individualistic variants of subjectivism. Consider, for example, cultural relativism.
According to this view, to judge a thing good means to judge that the members of
14 Goodwin and Darley also included the option Bother .^ Responses in favor of this option were not
considered in their analysis, however (Goodwin and Darley 2008, pp. 1344, 1348).
Fig. 2 Distribution of responses in the first stage of Goodwin and Darley’s 2008 experiments (see pp. 1347,
1351) as reinterpreted above
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the culture within which the judgement is made predominantly believe that the thing is
good. Within one particular culture there can only be one predominant view about
whether a thing is good. In order for cultural relativism not to entail that one party of a
moral disagreement is right and the other is wrong, this disagreement must therefore
take place between members of different cultures. However, neither group of re-
searchers promoted such an interpretation. Quite the contrary! Goodwin and Darley
described the disagreeing parties as subjects of their own study, which suggests that
they are students of the very same university (see 2008, p. 1362). And Wainryb et al.
even presented drawings which show the disagreeing parties standing face to face to
each other (2004, p. 692).
As follows from the above considerations, the researchers’ interpretation of BIt
is possible that both are right/both are right^ responses as indicating subjectivism
is inappropriate as well. Non-individualistic subjectivists should not interpret
Goodwin and Darley’s and Wainryb et al.’s disagreements according to this
response. For example, in order for cultural relativists to be drawn to the view
that the disagreeing parties are both right it would have to be the case that the
parties make their judgements within different cultures, and also that each of
their judgements conforms to the majority view of their respective culture. The
only variant of subjectivism which is actually reflected by R2 is individual
subjectivism. After all, the parties in the disagreements likely believe what they
say, and according to individual subjectivism, for an individual to believe a thing
to be right, wrong, good, bad, etc. already makes it true that the thing has that
moral property.
In sum, Goodwin and Darley and Wainryb et al. did not measure how many of their
subjects responded as realists versus subjectivists, but rather how many responded as
either realists or non-individualistic subjectivists versus individual subjectivists15:
(R1) One party in the disagreement is right, the other wrong = Realism, Non-
Individualistic Variants of Subjectivism
(R2) Both are right/it is possible that both are right = Individual Subjectivism
So what are the results of Goodwin and Darley’s and Wainryb et al.’s above
experiments? Both groups of researchers found that subjects predominantly
interpreted the moral disagreements they were presented with as involving one
party that is right and one party that is wrong. In particular, it was reported that
around 70 % of the responses in Goodwin and Darley’s experiments (personal
communication), and 100 % of the responses of the 5-year-old, 100 % of the
responses of the 7-year-old, and 94 % of the responses of the 9-year-old subjects
in Wainryb et al.’s study fall into this category (2004, pp. 693–694). While these
results have often been taken to support the view that ordinary people are
predominantly realists (see, e.g., Goodwin and Darley 2008, p. 1359), our above
15 That error theorist and non-cognitivist intuitions are not reflected by any of Goodwin and Darley’s and
Wainryb et al.’s options is a potential problem (see Pölzler 2014: 80–81). In the case of Goodwin and Darley it
is also somewhat ironic. After all, they attempted to measure the same kind of metaethical intuitions as in the
first stage of their first and second experiment, which exclusively focused on cognitivism and non-
cognitivism.
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reintepretations suggest that such a conclusion is in fact unsupported (see Fig. 3).
All that the experiments suggest is that intuitions in favour of realism and non-
individualistic variants of subjectivism are considerablymore widespread than intuitions
in favour of individual subjectivism— which should hardly come as a surprise, given
the obvious implausibility of individual subjectivism. In fact, at least among adults the
proportion of responses in favour of individual subjectivism is even higher than many
metaethicists probably would have thought.
5 Research Isolating Cultural Relativism
The next study on our list was conducted by Nichols (2004). Subjects in this study were
presented cases in which individuals from different cultures disagree about the moral
quality of an action. One of the individuals judges the action Bokay ,^ the other
individual judges it Bnot okay .^ In Experiment 1, for example, Nichols’ vignette reads
as follows:
John and Fred are members of different cultures, and they are in an argument.
John says, BIt’s okay to hit people just because you feel like it,^ and Fred says,
BNo, it is not okay to hit people just because you feel like it.^ John then says,
BLook you are wrong. Everyone I know agrees that it’s okay to do that.^ Fred
responds, BOh no, you are the one who is mistaken. Everyone I know agrees that
it’s not okay to do that.^ (Nichols 2004, p. 9)
Like with the studies considered in the previous Section, the question that was
supposed to bring out subjects’ metaethical intuitions concerned the interpreta-
tion of these cases of moral disagreement. In experiments 1 to 4 subjects could
choose from two kinds of interpretations: one according to which one of the two
Fig. 3 Distribution of responses in the second stage of Goodwin and Darley’s 2008 study (see pp. 1346–
1350, 1352–1354, personal communication) and Wainryb et al.’s 2004 study (see pp. 693–694) as
reinterpreted above
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individuals is right and the other is wrong; and one according to which Bthere is
no fact of the matter about unqualified moral claims^ and the claim at issue is
not Babsolutely true or false^:
– It is okay to hit people just because you feel like it, so John is right and Fred is
wrong.
– It is not okay to hit people just because you feel like it, so Fred is right and John is
wrong.
– There is no fact of the matter about unqualified claims like BIt’s okay to hit people
just because you feel like it.^ Different cultures believe different things, and it is
not absolutely true or false that it’s okay to hit people just because you feel like it.
(Nichols 2004, pp. 9–10)
On Nichols’ interpretation, responses of the first kind (answers 1 and 2 above)
indicate realist metaethical intuitions; responses of the second kind (answer 3) indicate
anti-realist intuitions (see 2004, p. 10).
(R1) A is right and B is wrong/B is right and A is wrong = Realism
(R2) There is no fact of the matter about unqualified moral claims; the moral claim at
issue is not absolutely true or false = Anti-Realism
Again, however, this interpretation is metaethically inadequate. While R1 may
indeed have mainly appealed to realists,16 the answer that there is no fact of the matter
about unqualified moral claims and that the moral claim at issue is not absolutely true
or false does not reflect all variants of anti-realism. Error theorists believe that there is a
fact of the matter about unqualified moral claims: all such claims are false. Non-
cognitivists believe that there is no fact of the matter about any moral claim, not just
about unqualified moral claims. Moreover, they do not only deny that moral claims are
Babsolutely^ true or false, but that these claims are true or false in any (robust) sense.
The intuitions that Nichols’ second response actually mainly captures are only those of
cultural relativists.
First, cultural relativism is incompatible with R1. As the disagreeing indi-
viduals are described as Bmembers of different cultures^, and each individual’s
judgement can be expected to conform to the predominant views of their
respective culture (they insist that Beverybody they know^ agrees with them),
cultural relativists are committed to the view that both individuals in the
disagreements are right. Second, although R2 does not explicitly state that both
individuals are right, it at least involves what may be understood as a (vague)
theoretical characterization of cultural relativism. The response’s second sen-
tence in particular (BDifferent cultures believe different things, and it is not
absolutely true or false that it’s okay to hit people just because you feel like
it^, Nichols 2004, p. 10) relates differences between the beliefs of cultures to
the denial of absolute moral truths and falsities.
16 Some variants of subjectivism, in particular more sophisticated ones (such as certain forms of response
dependence theory), may entail that one of the parties in Nichols’ disagreements is right and the other party is
wrong as well.
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In sum, then, rather than the proportion of realist versus anti-realist responses,
Nichols’ study seems to have mainly measured the proportion of realist versus cultural
relativist responses.17
(R1) A is right and B is wrong/B is right and A is wrong = Realism
(R2) There is no fact of the matter about unqualified moral claims; such claims are
not absolutely true or false = Cultural Relativism
While Nichols’ study has sometimes been claimed to show a clear tendency towards
realism (e.g., Sarkissian et al. 2011, p. 484),18 he himself explicitly rejected such an
interpretation (see 2004, p. 26). This rejection seems well-grounded, both on his
original understanding of subjects’ responses and, even more so, on my above reinter-
pretation. Although realism was only contrasted with one particular variant of anti-
realism, and although potentially confused Bmetaphysical relativists^ (subjects who
believed that ordinary physical facts are relative to the beliefs of cultures, 2004, p. 8)
were excluded from analysis, realism still failed to secure strong majorities. 42.5 % of
the subjects of Experiment 1, 30 % of the subjects of Experiment 2, 32.05 % of the
subjects of Experiment 319 and 22 % of the subjects of Experiment 4 rather preferred
cultural relativism (see 2004, pp. 10, 16, 18–19, 20, 22; see Fig. 4).
Admittedly, my reinterpretation of Nichols’ results is not beyond doubt itself. At
least his fifth experiment likely has sufficiently high validity, though. This experiment’s
formulation of R2 reflects cultural relativism more clearly than the formulations in the
other experiments. Having stressed the disagreeing individuals’ differing cultural
backgrounds, Nichols puts the response as saying that there is Bno objective fact,
independent of what different people think^ about the wrongness of the relevant
actions, and that while these actions are wrong for some people, they are not
Bobjectively wrong independent of what people think about them^ (2004, p. 21).20
Moreover, the fifth experiment’s vignettes and responses also suggest more clearly that
the disagreement at issue is of a specifically moral kind. They do not only speak about
the relevant actions being Bokay^ or Bnot okay ,^ but also about their being Bwrong^
(2004, p. 21). So what is the result of this most trustworthy part of Nichols’ study?
As it happens, Nichols’ fifth experiment strikingly confirms the findings of Exper-
iment 1 to 4. 33.3 % of the subjects in this experiment favored cultural relativism over
realism — a figure that is almost identical to the mean of the first four experiments
(31.64 %), and to the mean of all five experiments combined (31.97 %).
17 Like in the case of Goodwin and Darley and Wainryb et al. (Section 4), Nichols’ study may be criticized on
grounds of its failing to capture the full logical space of metaethical positions (see Pölzler 2014: 80–81).
18 Sarkissian et al.’s interpretation may be explained by their considering only Experiment 4 (which shows a
higher proportion of realist responses than all other experiments), and by their ignoring Nichols’ exclusion of
Bmetaphysical relativists^ (see below).
19 Experiment 3 contained two realism/cultural relativism-questions. To the first of these questions, 25.6 % of
subjects responded as cultural relativists, to the second 38.5 % of subjects. The figure given above represents
the average proportion of subjects who responded as cultural relativists in this experiment.
20 One possible objection against my interpretation of the fifth experiment’s version of R2 is that this response
is not only entailed by cultural relativism, but also by individual subjectivism. Individual subjectivists too
believe that actions are wrong for you or for me, without them being objectively wrong. However, due to
Nichols’ emphasis on the disagreeing individuals belonging to different cultures, his experiment likely still
mainly plays off cultural relativist intuitions against realist ones.
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6 Research Isolating Response Dependence Theory
The last early study on folk metaethics that I will consider in this article, conducted by
Nichols and Folds-Bennett (2003), involved children between four and six years.
Subjects were presented both moral sentences (e.g., Bit is good for one monkey to help
another hurt monkey^) and sentences about the instantiation of paradigmatic response-
dependent properties (e.g., Bgrapes are yummy^) (2003: B26-B27). For each sentence
they had to indicate whether they agreed to it. In case subjects did agree, the experi-
menter asked them two further questions about the sentence. The first question was
designed to determine whether subjects regarded the sentence as Bpreference-
independent^, i.e., as being true independently of the preferences of (certain) persons.
In particular, subjects were asked whether they believed the sentence to be true Bfor
some people^ or Bfor real^.
You know, I think grapes are yummy too. Some people don’t like grapes. They
don’t think grapes are yummy. Would you say that grapes are yummy for some
people or that they’re yummy for real? (Nichols and Folds-Bennett 2003, p. B27)
Nichols and Folds-Bennett’s second question concerned the Bgeneralizability^ of the
sentences at issue, i.e., whether these sentences are true at all times and places. To
determine subjects’ attitudes about this issue they were asked whether they believed
that the relevant moral or response-dependent property was instantiated B[w]ay back
then, before there were any people^.
Now, think about a long time ago, before there were any people. There were still
grapes, just like the grapes now. Way back then, before there were people, were
grapes yummy? (Nichols and Folds-Bennett 2003, p. B27)
By comparing subjects’ answers to these questions across the moral and paradig-
matically response-dependent domain Nichols and Folds-Bennett hoped to throw light
on the prevalence or strength of intuitions in favor of response-dependence theory.
Fig. 4 Distribution of responses in Nichols’ 2004 study (pp. 10, 16, 18–19, 20, 22) as reinterpreted above
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Subjects who judged response-dependence sentences to be as preference-independent
and generalizable as moral sentences were assumed to favor response-dependence
theory. Subjects who judged response-dependence sentences to be more or less
preference-independent and generalizable were taken to be drawn towards alternative
metaethical positions (see Nichols and Folds-Bennett 2004, pp. B30-B31).
But this methodology is problematic in several respects. First, it fails to
adequately measure subjects’ beliefs about the preference-independence and
generalizability of the sentences at issue. Consider the question of whether a
certain moral or response-dependence sentence is true Bfor real^ or Bfor some
people^. This question cannot only be read as asking whether the sentence is
made true by some people accepting it, but also as another question about the
sentence’s generalizability (Does it apply to all or only some people?) or as a
purely empirical question (Is it accepted by all or only some people?)
(Goodwin and Darley 2010, p. 167). The study’s generalizability question is
no less ambiguous. Subjects may, for example, have misread it as asking
whether the sentence would have been true for them if they themselves had
lived Bway back then, before there were any people^ (Nichols and Folds-
Bennett 2003, p. B28, fn. 4).21 Moreover, the study only addressed subjects’
beliefs about temporal, and not about spatial generalizability, i.e., generalizabil-
ity across cultures.
But suppose Nichols and Folds-Bennett did succeed in determining subjects’
beliefs about the preference-independence and generalizability of moral versus
response-dependence sentences. Even then their study likely would not yield any
evidence about the prevalence of response-dependence theory. While their
preference-independence question would only reveal whether children are drawn
to a particular alternative subjectivist position, namely a position according to
which moral sentences are made true by authorities or social conventions
(Nichols and Folds-Bennett 2003, p. B25), the question of the generalizability
of moral sentences does not have any direct implications for the study of folk
moral realism at all. Neither does generalizability entail realism nor non-
generalizability anti-realism — and of course, generalizability does not entail
anti-realism and non-generalizability does not entail realism either (Joyce 2007b;
see also Beebe and Sackris forthcoming, p. 12).
Nichols and Folds-Bennett might object that their interpretation is actually
more complex. Being preference-independent and generalizable, they might
argue, are necessary conditions of moral sentences. So if children believe that
response-dependence sentences do not meet these conditions, they likely do not
identify moral facts with response-dependent facts. However, first, that children
ascribe low preference-independence and generalizability to sentences about
simple response-dependent properties such as being yummy, fun, icky and
boring does not mean that they would do so with regard to more sophisticated
and metaethically relevant properties as well (being approved of by an ideal
21 One may object that if Nichols and Folds-Bennett had attempted to avoid all of the above ambiguities, their
questions would have become too complex to be understood by children between four and six years. This
consequence is indeed likely. However, rather than grounding a defense of Nichols and Folds-Bennett’s above
formulations this recognition rather suggests that preference-independence and generalizability research on
young children is infeasible.
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observer, say).22 And second, it is unclear whether preference-independence and
generalizability are necessary conditions of moral sentences in the first place.
Nichols and Folds-Bennett may take this claim to be supported by Elliot Turiel
and colleagues’ finding that people generally regard moral sentences (as op-
posed to conventional sentences) as authority-independent and generalizable.
But not only is the conceptual relevance of findings such as these contested,
people may also regard a significant proportion of moral sentences as not
authority-independent and generalizable at all (e.g., Kelly et al. 2007;
Quintelier and Fessler 2015).23
In sum, the problems with Nichols and Folds-Bennett’s methodology are so grave
that it cannot even be rescued by metaethical reinterpretations. Their study fails to
provide any reliable evidence about the prevalence of moral realism.
7 Intrapersonal Variation and Traditional Metaethics
Section 3 to 6 provided a detailed analysis of four prominent early studies on folk
metaethics: studies by Goodwin and Darley (2008); Wainryb et al. (2004), Nichols
(2004), and Nichols and Folds-Bennett (2003). All of these studies have been claimed
to support a tendency towards realism. On closer consideration, however, we did not
find any such tendency emerging. Subjects in the studies more often responded in ways
that indicate non-cognitivism than cognitivism (Section 3), they at least sometimes
preferred individual subjectivism to realism (Section 4), and they often favored cultural
relativism over realism (Section 5).
The above findings can be explained in two distinct ways: by subjects’ intuitions
having varied interpersonally (some were consistently drawn to one metaethical
position, others consistently to other positions), and by their intuitions having varied
intrapersonally (one and the same subject was drawn to one metaethical position with
regard to some moral issues and to other metaethical positions with regard to others).
Comprehensive explanations may well involve certain degrees of interpersonal varia-
tion. For the most part, however, subjects’ intuitions likely rather varied Bwithin^ them.
Evidence for this interpretation comes in particular from the first stage of Goodwin and
Darley’s study (Section 3). 37 of the 50 subjects of their first and 65 of the 66 subjects
of their second experiment responded as cognitivists to some moral issues and as non-
cognitivists to others (2008, p. 1346, 1352). For example, while many subjects
considered the sentence BRobbing a bank in order to pay for an expensive holiday is
a morally bad action^ to be true (Experiment 1) or to admit of a correct answer as to its
truth (Experiment 2), they did not concede this status to issues regarding stem cell
research, abortion or assisted suicide (see 2008, pp. 1347, 1351).
Recent studies on folk metaethics have often inherited earlier research’s inadequate
operational definitions of realism and anti-realism (e.g., Wright et al. 2013, 2014).
Some of these studies have also been based on alternative problematic definitions (e.g.,
22 Children between four and six may not be able to grasp more complex response-dependent concepts. But
this again does not so much support Nichols and Folds-Bennett as it shows that children may not be the right
kind of subjects for studies on folk metaethics.
23 For defenses of Turiel and colleagues’ findings see Sousa 2009 and Sousa et al. 2009.
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Beebe and Sackris forthcoming; Cova and Ravat 2008). To the extent that their results
can be reinterpreted in reliable ways and involve more than one moral issue, however,
recent studies almost unanimously suggest (and have been widely taken to suggest)
very high degrees of intrapersonal variation as well. Cova and Ravat (2008), for
example, found that although subjects in their study had only been presented with
either two (Experiments 3 and 4) or four (Experiment 1) moral issues, almost one third
of them varied in terms of their siding with realism or (what I propose to interpret as)
anti-realism.24 Wright et al. (2013,2014) recently addressed this variation explicitly. In
one of their experiments 34 out of 47 subjects gave variable metaethical groundings
(2013, p. 7), and in another this was even true for all 63 participants (2014, p. 36).25
One possible explanation of the intrapersonal variation suggested by studies on folk
moral realism is that subjects in these studies were confused. They simply did not
(fully) understand what it means to say of something that it is morally right, wrong,
good, bad, etc. (see Loeb 2008, p. 363). While this explanation may indeed hold true
for certain subjects, Wright et al. have recently convincingly argued that at least some
intrapersonal variation is rather based on a genuine competence. First, when subjects in
studies on folk moral realism were asked why they had responded as they did, their
verbal explanations often at least roughly reflected the metaethical positions their
responses were supposed to indicate (Wright et al. 2013, pp. 349–352). And second,
Wright et al. also developed a plausible theory of why people favour different meta-
ethical positions on different occasions. This variation, they argue, to some extent
regulates how open individuals and communities are to divergent moral judgements.
The more we believe that performing some action is to be prohibited, or is not to be
tolerated, the more objectivity we ascribe to the wrongness of this action (Wright et al.
2013; Wright et al. 2014).
What do a subjects’ genuinely variable intuitions mean for his/her metaethical
classification? Is this subject a realist? Is s/he an anti-realist? At first sight the
prevalence of intrapersonal variation may seem to have the surprising result of reha-
bilitating the experiential hypothesis. Many subjects in studies such as Goodwin and
Darley’s, Cova and Ravat’s, and Wright et al.’s seem to have believed that while there is
no objective truth about some moral issues, there is such a truth about others. These
subjects thus endorsed the existence of at least some objective moral truths. And does
not this suffice for considering them realists, given our definition of realism as the view
that there are objective moral truths (a definition which does not refer to how many
24 Cova and Ravat take their non-objectivist options to indicate subjectivism. In fact, however, some of these
options (believing of the disagreeing parties that B[t]hey are both wrong^, or that B[n]one of them is right or
wrong^) are compatible with error theory and non-cognitivism as well. Subjects who turn out subjectivists,
according to Cova and Ravat’s terminology, are thus better classified as anti-realists.
25 These experiments are not Bcherry-picked^, i.e., simply those which yielded the highest proportions of
intrapersonal variation, but are rather the only ones for whom Wright et al. reported these proportions. Wright
et al. combined Goodwin and Darley’s measures of realism, as they were discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
Properly interpreted, for a subject to have intrapersonally varying metaethical intuitions in their studies
accordingly means for her/him to have been drawn to cognitivism (first stage) and realism or non-
individualistic variants of subjectivism (second stage) with regard to some moral issues, and to non-
cognitivism (first stage) and individual subjectivism (second stage) with regard to other issues. Note that in
their 2014 studyWright et al. were not interested in the prevalence of metaethical intuitions per se, but rather in
how these intuitions relate to people’s tolerance for diverging moral beliefs. For a brief summary of their
respective findings and an assessment of their implications for debates about moral projectivism see Pölzler
2016.
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such truths there are or whether there are such truths with regard to all moral issues)?
However, this attempt of rescuing the experiential hypothesis likely fails.
Traditional metaethical positions are based on two important semantic assumptions
(Gill 2009, pp. 216–218; Sinnott-Armstrong 2009, pp. 237–239). According to what
has been called the Bdeterminacy assumption^ (Gill 2009, p. 216), the meaning of all or
at least most moral sentences is determinate, i.e., these sentences are either true or false
in virtue of their in/correctly representing objective facts, true or false in virtue of their
in/correctly representing subjective facts, or not truth-apt at all. It cannot be the case
that two or more of these accounts of the meaning of moral sentences are equally
correct. According to the second important assumption, the Buniformity assumption^
(Gill 2009, p. 216), all moral sentences have the same meaning: either all of these
sentences are true or false in virtue of their in/correctly representing objective facts, all
of these sentences are true or false in virtue of their in/correctly representing subjective
facts, or all of these sentences are not truth-apt at all.26
Because of realism’s commitment to the above assumptions it must be understood as
entailing that all moral sentences determinately are true or false in virtue of their in/
correctly representing objective facts. But subjects with intrapersonally varying meta-
ethical intuitions obviously reject this claim. They either believe that moral sentences
have both objective and non-objective meaning, or (more likely, given that their
intuitions vary with the nature of moral issues and that this variation to some extent
reflects a conscious strategy) that only some moral sentences have objective meaning,
but others have not. In any case, these subjects reject a central assumption of realism
and thus cannot qualify as favouring this position.
Of course, subjects with intrapersonally varying metaethical intuitions must not be
classified as anti-realists either. Variants of anti-realism too entail that all moral
sentences determinately have one and the same meaning, for example, that they
determinately are all true or false in virtue of their in/correctly representing subjective
facts (subjectivism) or that they determinately are all non-truth-apt (non-cognitivism).
These subjects should therefore rather be regarded as neither realists nor anti-realists.
They make up their own metaethical category. FollowingWright et al. (2013), I suggest
to call subjects with varying metaethical intuitions Bmetaethical pluralists^ (because
they endorse a plurality of metaethical positions). This means that by suggesting a very
high degree of intrapersonal variation research on folk metaethics contradicts the
experiential hypothesis’ claim that ordinary people experience morality as realist-
seeming after all. It suggests that rather than realist-seeming, our moral experience is
Bpluralist-seeming^.
26 Gill and Sinnott-Armstrong provide two kinds of evidence for the prevalence of the above assumptions.
First, they point out that metaethicists have commonly tried to establish their semantic claims by analyzing a
few examples of standard uses of moral sentences, then generalizing to these sentences as a whole (see Gill
2009, p. 217; Sinnott-Armstrong 2009, pp. 237–238). And second, they cite formulations of semantic claims
that clearly reflect one or both assumptions, such as A. J. Ayer’s claim that Bin every case in which one would
commonly be said to be making an ethical judgment, the function of the relevant ethical word is purely
‘emotive’^ (Ayer 1952: 108; note how Ayer speaks of Bevery case^), or Frank Jackson’s claim BBy the time I
have finished, you will have before you a schematic account of the meaning of ethical ascriptions and
sentences in purely descriptive terms^ (Jackson 1998: 113; note that Jackson does not restrict his account to
only some of these ascriptions and sentences) (for these and more examples see Sinnott-Armstrong 2009, pp.
237–238).
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8 Conclusion
According to the argument from moral experience, ordinary people experience morality
as realist-seeming, and we have therefore prima facie reason to believe that realism is
true. Some proponents of this argument have claimed that the hypothesis that ordinary
people experience morality as realist-seeming is supported by psychological research
on folk metaethics. While most recent research has been thought to contradict this
claim, four prominent earlier studies indeed seem to suggest a tendency towards
realism. In this paper I provided a detailed internal critique of these four studies. I
argued that, once interpreted properly, all of them turn out in line with recent research.
They suggest that most ordinary people experience morality as pluralist- rather than
realist-seeming, i.e., that ordinary people have the intuition that realism is true with
regard to some moral issues, but variants of anti-realism are true with regard to others.
This result is of considerable philosophical significance (see Loeb 2007b, p.
470). The broad majority of metaethicists — anti-realists as well as realists (e.g.,
Blackburn 2006, p. 153; Mackie 2011, p. 35) — have accepted the argument from
moral experience. They have therefore operated under the assumption that in order
for realists to succeed they must only defeat all plausible arguments against their
view (McNaughton 1988, pp. 40–41). If the folk really do not experience morality
as a realm of objective truths, however, and this experience consequently cannot
possibly ground any prima facie reason for believing in the existence of such
truths, then realists are challenged to provide (more) positive evidence for their
view as well. And anti-realism (or pluralism) comes out as a more attractive
option than has recently been thought.
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